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For most of the past decade the managements of
international mining companies have been pre-
dominantly concerned with their corporate survival.
They have had to cope with the consequences of excess
capacity created by the failure of demand to live up to
the extravagant expectations of the 1960s and early
1970s, and, in more muted form, of the late 1970s. In
retrospect demand predictions for all minerals which
were in general currency even five years ago now
appear too optimistic. Such predictions were shared
by mining companies as much as by governments and
consumers. Against this background new develop-
ments have been far from the thoughts of most mining
companies. The keynote of most corporate statements
of recent years has been retrenchment and cost
reduction in the face of adverse structural change.
Opinions may differ over the magnitude of this
change, and indeed over whether it is genuinely
structural or merely of an extended cyclical nature.
Such niceties are not debated in an industry facing
adversity. Yet they are by no means irrelevant
questions because different answers will dictate
differing strategies for the next decade.
The State of Mineral Markets
Excess capacity has been the most marked and
pervasive characteristic of mineral industries in recent
years. Table 1 summarises, in a rough and ready form,
the world's capacity utilisation in 45 minerals in the
mid 1980s.
The table covers all the main metallic and non-metallic
minerals entering international trade, and many of
lesser importance. The data, with all their underlying
statistical and conceptual weaknesses, should not be
strained too far. None the less, capacity utilisation
exceeds 75 per cent in less than a quarter of the
minerals, and many of those are of little economic
significance. The four with the highest utilisation
rates, for example, are graphite, strontium, gypsum,
and silver. More than adequate supplies of the last two
are available from sources other than primary mining.
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Table ¡
World Capacity Utilisation in Minerals: Mid 1980s
Production in 1984 as percentage of estimated
capacities in 1985
Capacity Utilisation % No. of Minerals
Source: Based on US Bureau of Mines' Data (Mineral Facts
and Problems, and Mineral Commodity Summaries).
In the short to medium term there is ample capacity to
meet present and prospective demand for nearly all
minerals, provided prices are right. That would be so
even when due allowance is made for strikes and other
disruptions, and for the gradual attrition of
uneconomic projects.
Arithmetically, it would take five years of five per cent
per annum growth, and eight years of three per cent
per annum growth for capacity utilisation to rise from
75 to 95 per cent. Not only is capacity well below
75 per cent in most cases, but some limited investment
continues in many minerals, and demand has been
growing much more slowly than three per cent per
annum, even allowing for cyclical variations in growth
rates.
Over 80 4
75-80 6
70-75 6
65-70 7
60-65 7
55-60 7
50-55 2
45-50 3
Under 45 3
Total: 45
This rudimentary analysis demonstrates that the
problem of excess capacity is not confined to those
minerals which are most widely traded internationally,
nor to those which have received the most publicity.
Not all minerals have been affected to the same degree,
if at all, by substitution induced by miniaturisation
and technical innovation. Nor has the diffusion of
ownership apparent in the main metallic minerals in
the late 1960s and early 1970s been common in many
non-metallic minerals or minor metals. In short, each
individual mineral's problems have been exacerbated
by specific structural influences, but the basic
problems were created by the unexpected and
prolonged slowdown in the world's economic growth
rates.
A major effect of prolonged excess capacity has been
to drive prices down below even the variable costs of
production of a substantial portion of the world's
capacity. Many of the mines and processing facilities
consequently forced into losses might be technically
efficient and well managed. They probably would
have regarded themselves as reasonably well insulated
from adverse price fluctuations, which may have been
aggravated by unpredictably varying exchange rates.
The near universal response of the minerals industry,
state as much as privately owned, has been to
concentrate single-mindedly upon reducing costs,
both for existing operations and for such new ventures
as have survived. It is an economic truism, in stagnant
or over supplied markets, that the full costs (at an
acceptable rate of return on capital) of completely new
operations should be no greater than the variable costs
of existing plants, if new investment is to be justified.
Very few projects can pass this rigorous test after a
period of rapid capital cost escalation, and with
historically high real costs of debt servicing.
The mining industry, as a whole, has been successful
not just in restraining but also in reducing its costs.
The average costs of mining and milling per tonne of
ore treated have fallen in the United States since 1981
by some 15 to 20 per cent. Elsewhere costs have
declined by around 20 to 30 per cent from their peak of
the early 1880s. Outside the United States much ofthe
decline was due to the depreciation of local currencies
against the US dollar, but there have also been genuine
improvements in efficiency. The effects of the drop in
mining costs have been accentuated in many instances
by mines raising their cut off grades. These cannot be
altered very often, and any change imposes a delayed
cost. Indeed a sizeable, but totally unknown
proportion of the industry's cost cutting has been
purchased through reductions in economically
accessible reserves, through the shortening of mine
lives, or through the delay of necessary spending.
Replacements of equipment may have been delayed,
advance development deferred, and maintenance
skimped. Exploration expenditure was often one of
the first items to be cut.
If much of the response to weak markets has been to
defer costs, there has also been a permanent
improvement of productivity, in all aspects of mineral
production, distribution, and marketing. The belated
recognition that prices would not rise to bail out those
making losses forced a continuing reassessment of
production techniques. The application of computers
to all aspects of the industry from exploration
onwards, the use of more efficient and safer
explosives, the design and introduction of less energy
or labour intensive processes, and simplification and
decentralisation of management structures are a few
of the many avenues that have been explored. As
innovations diffuse throughout the industry, there will
be further declines in average costs, irrespective of any
change in exchange rates or input costs. This means
that in real terms mineral prices will probably not
recover even to their previous averages.
Switching to demand, the outlook depends primarily
on the growth of economic activity, especially in newly
industrialising and developing countries. There has
been considerable debate within the mining industry
about the extent to which minerals are going out of
fashion. The concern has been most intense in the
older base metals such as copper. The threats from
substitution are here most immediately obvious, as
indeed they have been for the last 30 years. The
statistical evidence in fact shows that there has been no
sudden change in the relationship between the growth
of demand for metals, including copper, and the
growth of economic activity, however it is defined.
The consumption of copper, lead, and tin per unit of
GDP measured in real terms for the Western World as
a whole has declined at fairly constant rates
throughout the post-war period. The rate of decline of
zinc consumption per unit of GDP accelerated from
1969-70 onwards and there was a change in trend for
aluminium and nickel in the mid 1970s. In other
words, there has, in most instances, been no dramatic
new factor affecting the consumption of metals during
the past few years.
Metals have admittedly suffered from the reducing
share of GDP devoted to capital expenditure of all
types. The main cause of the low growth rates of
demand for metals has, however, been the low growth
rate of the world economy as a whole when compared
with the decade up to 1974.
The prospects for the world economy are outside the
scope of this article. It is sufficient to note the general
belief that the next decade's growth rates will be no
worse than those of the last decade, and possibly much
better. The recent weakening of oil prices and falls in
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interest rates will not make a summer, and the former
has been too sudden to be sustainable in the longer
run. None the less, these changes have helped lift the
clouds which have for so long obscured future
economic growth. In the next economic upswing, if
not in the next year or so, construction activity and
demand for capital will probably revive. Much of the
existing capital stock will then be approaching 20
years old, and in many instances much older. The
revival of industrial profitability in the present cycle
will help provide funds to finance re-equipment, the
replacement of degraded and outmoded infrastructure,
and the development of the social capital of those
countries where it is presently deficient. There is,
therefore, a reasonable prospect that demand for
minerals in general, and for the main metallic minerals
in particular, will grow rather faster during the 1990s
than in the present decade.
Even ignoring this latter prospect, the gradual rise in
demand, coupled with the attrition of existing mines
and processing facilities, will continue to eliminate
excess capacity as the 1990s unfold. The rate of
movement back towards a more healthy balance
between demand and capability to supply will vary
from one mineral to another. It will also naturally be
affected by developments in the economy at large.
When balance is regained, however, prices will move
back towards a closer relationship with the marginal
costs of production than has prevailed for the past 12
years. The improvements in costs, already described,
mean that any consequent rise in prices may well be
muted. The nature of most mineral markets is such,
however, that prices will probably overshoot their
equilibrium levels, thereby starting off the cyclical
process once again.
Mining Companies' Responses
Many of those mining companies which have
remained in business either with their original capital
structures and shareholdings intact, or after being
absorbed into other groupings, have a jaundiced view
of the mining industry's future. Whilst some might
acknowledge the economic logic of the outlook
sketched above, they are generally unwilling to
commit themselves to new projects. Others would
question whether excess capacity will ever be
eliminated sufficiently to allow prices to harden.
The international mining companies' expertise may lie
in the discovery, development and management of
mines, sometimes in specific products. With a very few
exceptions, however, they are not in business to obtain
supplies of minerals either for their home countries'
consumers or for integrated supply systems. Their
main objective is to earn profits for their shareholders.
Thus they are not indissolubly wedded to the mining
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industry. Their alternatives to investing in a specific
project are not just investment in other less attractive
deposits elsewhere, but also to switch to different areas
of business or not invest at all. Diversification away
from mining has been a common response to the
industry's prolonged recession. Even where companies
remain in mining, they have sought to broaden their
portfolios, both geographically and by product. In
some instances the diversifications have been ill
judged, and fingers have been burnt. The differences
of a new venture from mining have not been fully
appreciated, or the price paid has been too great
relative to the prospective return. Periodic failures
have not, however, reduced the general desire to
broaden asset bases, an objective likely to persist for
some years.
Diversification will be accompanied by a continuing
quest for lower costs at established operations. It is
sometimes forgotten that it is arithmetically impossible
for every producer to achieve costs that are in the
industry's lowest quartile, but every producer has such
an objective. The more others achieve worthwhile cost
savings, the greater the pressures on the remainder.
This pressure spills over into the consideration of new
projects. Regardless of where they are situated, new
projects have to compete in world markets throughout
their prospective lives. The past decade has amply
demonstrated how relative, costs can be changed
overnight by movements in exchange rates, by-
product credits, or energy prices. There is no
assurance that any given ratio or level of factor costs is
likely to persist. Hence it is insufficient to rely on
relatively low labour or energy costs alone as
justification for a project. Even less faith can be placed
in investment incentives or favourable tax treatment
alone, although both may be needed. Project
managers have to aim for internationally competitive
costs from the outset and be able to sustain their
competitiveness.
Whilst the long established mining companies are in
the main drawing in their horns, relative newcomers to
the industry are more adventurous. Not only are they
often free of the traumas of recent years, but they are
able to acquire assets relatively cheaply. Often these
assets are sold without any debilitating financing
charges and their operating costs are competitive.
Unfortunately for market balance, they can produce
cheaply, if only for a limited period. As such
newcomers acquire experience, they may become
interested in totally new projects rather than re-
opening existing facilities, but it is too soon to tell.
Even those relatively few companies which are
interested in developing new mines have become
highly selective. The tendency is to go for the higher
grade, more accessible deposits. Not only do they
concentrate on the lower cost projects, but they also
expect stable and equitable terms and conditions for
their investments. Their caution is accentuated by that
of the banks and other financial institutions. Most of
these are more sophisticated than the (genuine) bank
which believes that today's price escalating at one per
cent per annum in money terms is a rational basis for
evaluating a copper project. Even so, banks do have a
naturally cautious view ofthe mining industry. Access
to adequate loan finance on acceptable terms is
invariably a precondition of a mining company's
investment. Hence the mining companies have to
carry the lenders with them when they contemplate
new investments of any magnitude. Recent history has
made the banks somewhat chary of lending to large
projects in politically or economically unstable areas.
Their caution in turn reinforces that of many mining
companies. In consequence, few new projects are
under development throughout the mining industry.
Many of those which are proceeding are financed by
successful state enterprises, such as CODELCO of
Chile, are expansions of existing operations, or are so
potentially attractive as to surmount the various
hurdles.
The Flow of Private Direct Investment to
Developing Countries
The international mineral industry's collective anorexia
falls particularly heavily on the developing countries.
With a few exceptions, such as Chile, these countries
lack a deep and broad based mining tradition, and
their infrastructure may be rudimentary. The
apparent fragility of their economies and political
systems deters all but the most resolute investor.
In most minerals, there is a large inventory of ore
deposits discovered in the post war decades. Many are
in developing countries, who may believe that they
have potentially remunerative assets. Most were,
however, found when cost structures were markedly
different, and when demand was growing rapidly.
Today the large majority of undeveloped ore bodies
do not contain reserves which are likely to be
economic in the foreseeable future. Attention is
normally concentrated solely on the grade and size of
deposits rather than on the implied costs, including
taxation and financing charges of any product in the
market place. Yet the latter is the crucial test of
viability made by international companies.
With the withdrawal of most oil companies and the
hesitancy of banks and other financial institutions, the
international mining companies are one of the few
remaining potential sources of finance and know how
for those countries which lack established mining
expertise. The last few years' experiences have
demonstrated all too clearly the relative scarcity of
effective talent in all aspects of mine development and
operation. They have brought out the need for firm,
coherent, and well targeted management, if mines are
to remain competitive. Such management is most
likely to be provided by organisations which have a
strong financial interest in a project's long term
profitability.
Where new ore deposits are clearly viable in the terms
stated earlier, a competent mining company can
usually be found that will be interested in their
development. By their very nature, however, such
projects are relatively rare in today's oversupplied
markets (as are competent companies). Those
countries which have mineral resources have to go out
and woo potential investors ratherthan expect a flood
of eager suitors. The most effective enticements are a
stable and assured legal, institutional and fiscal
framework, and the prospect of earning and remitting
attractive profits in the resources deployed.
In summary, all countries will be affected by the
continuing oversupply of minerals. Those countries
with well established domestic mining enterprises,
such as Brazil and Chile, will be able to develop new
ore bodies, even without the assistance of international
mining companies. They would be ill advised to do so,
however, unless the prospective ventures appeared not
just competitive internationally but relatively low
cost. The international mining companies have
collectively remained interested in investing in a
limited range of minerals, and notably in gold, but
even this now faces potentially weak markets in which
relative competitiveness counts. There will always be
exceptions and special situations but other mining and
mineral processing projects stand relatively little
chance of attracting foreign interest, unless they are
prospectively low cost. As a rule, foreign companies
are interested not in mining products for the limited
domestic markets of developing countries but for
exports.
The mining companies' caution will persist for several
more years until excess capacity is squeezed out, and
prices resume a healthier relationship with marginal
costs. Few developing countries will be able to count
on direct foreign investment in their mineral
resources until well into the 1990s. Given the relative
inertia of mineral markets, it is quite possible that
today's lack of investment will then precipitate
shortages and high prices. At present very few mining
companies are prepared to treat that as worthy of
consideration; in the long run, after all, we are all
dead. Survival today is more highly regarded by the
mining industry than possible prosperity in the life
hereafter.
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